The Review recently reported that I had expressed concerns about the tsunami siren project. Since I have recieved inquiries,
(1) I think the HMB sirens should be located out of the dam inundation and tsunami run up zone so that it will survive (the plan is for the sirens to be usable for multiple emergencies). The battery box is 10 feet above the ground and would be needlessly wiped out. Our LCP policies, zoning ordinances and general plan safety element (did you know we had one?) all prohibit development in this location.
(2) The sirens are intended to alert people for in a one-mile radius, and so it’s going to be pretty loud (if you’re an engineer, the sound increases inversely to the square of the distance from the source). That mean that if you’re 400 feet or less from the horn (in the current location, that would be me, but if the horn is too close to your house, it could be you), it will be really loud. If you have ever inadvertently tripped an alarm in a small room, it is not just awakening; it is dazing. With such a radius, and the City’s open space and easements, we should be able to locate the siren in such a way that all homes in the target region get the warning, but the distance from the siren to the first house is maximized. Apparently, the proposal was initially to place the siren in the middle of Casa del Mar. I applaud the decision to relocate it, but not in the coastal hazard zone, and not so close to the SAM Plant workers and to my corner of the neighborhood. The impact could be reduced by targeting the horns more carefully, and by having additional (less loud) siren poles at other locations.
(3) The testing plan described in the project was vague, and the limit of 1 minute of siren blasting per month is not justified for reliability testing; most of that can be done silently, and the horn can be tested in 50 milliseconds, enough time to observe the amperage on the siren circuit, and then be ended. It would be over before anyone know it started.
The real objective of testing aeems to be to train the public (hence the reference to “duck and cover” drill for those of us old enough to remember the Cuban Missile Crisis). I’m all for training, but want it to be effective. And as others have commented, I want to see that it is part of a larger plan that leads to a safe evacuation. Perhaps that is the case, but none of that was in evidence. Moreover, under the proposed conditions, the duration of testing could be modified without limit by a stroke of the HMB Planning Director’s pen. A change like that can have significant impacts, and deserves to be the subject of a CDP amendment, not directorial discretion.
(continued in first reply)